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Epistemizing the Worlds
A Reply to Gregory E. Ganssle

MARK McLEoD-HARRISON

Religious Studies Department
George Fox Universih;
Newburg, Oregon

In "Realism and Irrealism: A Dialogue," I argued that between the two
extremes of realism and antirealism is a plausible position I call "irrealism."'
If realism is the position that the world is the way it is (namely, a "singular
way") independent of any significant, human noetic contribution, and antirealism the extreme opposite position (namely, that there are many worlds
and that the worlds are entirely the way they are because humans make them
the way they are), then irrealism is the position that tries to avoid the skepticism of the former and the radical relativism of the latter. In his review of
Realism and Antirealism, where the aforementioned essay appeared,
Gregory Ganssle replies directly to my essay, particularly to my defense of
irrealism, by raising two questions. 2 He writes: "What does it take to epistemize? More specifically, what does it take to epistemize in such a way that
our epistemizing contributes to the truth of the thing epistemized?"3 He continues, describing my position:
.. . the claim is that we hold to irrealism or we refrain from all epistemizing. The realist must refrain, if she wishes to be a consistent
realist. Before I challenge this central claim, I want to point out that
McLeod[-Harrison] is laying a huge burden on realism. One cannot
be a rational realist. It is not because the arguments against realism are
so strong that one cannot be a rational realist. It is that to put forward
any argument at all is to epistemize and, therefore, to contradict realism. To be rational is to epistemize.'
I. MarkS. McLeod, "Realism and Irrealism: A Dialogue," in Realism and Antirealism, ed.
William P. Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, I 999), 26-40.
2. Gregory E. Ganssle, review of Realism and Antirealism, ed. William P. Alston,
Philosophia Christi 6 (2004): 341- 5.
3. Ibid., 343.
4. Ibid., 344.

Ganssle criticizes my early attempt to clarify some of the issues
realism/antirealism debate. While I still agree with the general aim
essay, I want to respond to Ganssle's remarks about it. First, I want to
my position a little more fully, a position to which I am more committed
than at the writing of the earlier essay (where, as Ganssle points out, I
ted in a note that I was not sure that I agreed with irrealism). Second, I
to state my disagreements with some points I made in the earlier work.
I want to provide an answer, although still only a beginning one, to
quite important questions. Finally, I want to reply directly to Ganssle's
cism of my argument at a point where I think Ganssle crucially
stands it.

Realisms and Nonrealisms
The position I took in "Realism and Antirealism: A Dialogue" is a
dle road between what I would now characterize as "noetic realism"
"noetic antirealism." Noetic realism holds that the way the world is,
some more or less obvious exceptions for mental entities such as ·
states of affairs brought about directly by human thinking, (such as a
new architecture), is not dependent upon any human noetic feat. A noetic
is any conceptualizing, thinking, believing, or any other cognitive
human beings. Noetic nonrealism, in contrast, takes the position that the
the world is is dependent upon noetic feats in some significant
Noetic nonrealism can be thought of as monism or pluralism. Let us say
is a monist if one thinks that human noetic contribution to the way the
is presents the world as having a singular true description. Here one can
of Kant or perhaps some version of Hilary Putnam's internal realism. On
other hand, one is a pluralist if one thinks that human noetic
the world presents the world as having a number of different but true
tions. Here one can think of Nelson Goodman or Michael
Furthermore, pluralism comes in at least two forms. One can be a f.H"'""""~
and suggest that there is only one actual world with many different but
ly true descriptions or one can be a pluralist and suggest that there are
actual worlds, all of which can have true descriptions. The former is
in Lynch, the latter in Goodman. In its most radical forms, I would
terize noetic nonrealism as noetic antirealism, which is a nonrealist
position in which truth is understood to be epistemically rooted. Here
might think of certain, but by no means all, "postmodem" works. As
antirealism is committed to a radical relativism in which there are no
ent limits except the limits to the way one epistemizes the
Unfortunately, in "Realism and Antirealism: A Dialogue," I characterized
irrealist position in terms of an epistemic notion oftruth, namely, "truth is

\(~art,

at least) an episte~ic notion so that so~ehow the worl~'s be!ng the :vay

!i!t is (or the worlds' bemg the way they are) 1s due to our ep1stem1c contnbui,p ons." I think now that this way of putting the matter was incautious. I would
~~ike to be more circumspect here and distance my position from any sort of
s~istemic theory of truth while yet holding to noetic nonrealism.
A second use of the terms "realism" and "nonrealism" is alethic, followijng William Alston. Alethic realism is realism about truth. Truth, as such, is
~ property that some truth-bearers have and others do not. In addition, when
~~ truth-bearer is true, it is true simply because of the way the world is and not
\f ecause of some epistemic contribution of the person holding the truth-bear~~r. In short, an alethic realist affirms that a truth-value bearer is true when
i,~ ings are as the truth-value bearer says they are. The truth of the truth-bear!:~r is not the result of human noetic contribution (with a few exceptions hav;,jhg to do with some belief being true because I am thinking it).
Alston has argued, persuasively, that minimalist alethic realism can be
~~ompatible with any number of ontological positions on noetic realism and
1nonrealism. Michael Lynch goes one step further and has well argued that
k lethic realism can be compatible with metaphysical pluralism, and in partic~lar a metaphysical pluralism in which the plural stories told of the world are
~~e result of alternative conceptual schemes embedded in our worldviews. I
!think both Alston and Lynch are right.

Ways of Cognizing
However, I think there are some important ways Lynch's approach to the
fmatter goes wrong. Without going into detail here, let me simply note the
~ssues surrounding how Lynch resolves the "consistency problem." The
1
problem is how to state a pluralist account with alternative truths without, in
~~e end, making them consistent and hence undermining the pluralism. I
ipelieve the problem can be solved by the introduction of God into each and
'¥very world (or ways the world is). I attempted to introduce God in "Realism
'~nd Irrealism: A Dialogue." This is a very important feature of my account
i:Pf irrealism that Ganssle does not discuss in his review. But we can forego
;~ntering that discussion here, and tum to reply more directly to Ganssle's
,questions and his criticism.
Ganssle asks what it takes to epistemize and more particularly, what it
~akes to epistemize so that our epistemizing contributes to the truth of the
i!hing epistemized. To answer these questions, it will be helpful if we speak
~ot just of epistemizing but about different kinds of cognizing. Here is where
~ proper corrective to my lack of caution in "Realism and Antirealism: A
i;pialogue" begins, for such a move more closely gets to the central point of
1hoetic irrealism.

First, we should not take cognizing too narrowly. Noetic feats come ;IJ
all sorts and to have a thought is not just to consider some linguistic noti~~
or other. Thoughts can and certainly do include ideas linguistically cO¢~
strued: "That ball is green" is certainly a thought one can have. But the fe.~~
ing of love is equally a thought, as is the experience of an abstract artwo.
We should not confuse, for example, one's awareness of what is exemplifi~~
by a "purist" painting and the propositions one might form about it. 1.1~~
experience of the former-the experience of patterns, shapes and colorg-.g;!l
no less conceptual than the idea, "what I'm looking at is regular, square ~~
purple." Both, I will assume here, fall within the range of cognition. Wim!
that in mind, I suggest that there are at least four kinds of cognizers, thatil
four kinds of noetic feat: epistemizers, conceptualizers, emoters and
ceivers.
Noetic feats that epistemize are, generally, those that involve some SQJill
of grasping, understanding, or ranking of truth-value bearers (propositio!l~~
statements, assertions, beliefs, acceptances, claims, or sentences, leaviifl
open what each of these things might be) in regard to their being true/~~
rationally acceptable. It is important to note that the role of episternizing ~
not one that makes truth-bearers true in a sense that would make alethic re~~~
ism false. Epistemizing as described here sets out to describe what is thet~l
without begging questions about what makes it be there.
In contrast, noetic feats that conceptualize do cognitive work but n(,)'tl
necessarily epistemizing work. In one sense, for a person to conceptuali~~
about a chair is for her to think about, apply concepts to, or otherwise engag~
in cognitive activities that do not epistemize. This first sort of conceptuaH~
ing is typically explained in terms of the linguistic. To have a concept ofa'
chair is to be able to apply the linguistic term "chair" in the proper mann~5~
That we do so linguistically is not to say that we always think with language~
It is to say that the symbol system we use for these sorts of concepts is lit{~
guistic. A linguistic symbol system is thus required for a linguistic concepftj!~
alizing to occur. For one to epistemize is to take something that is "alread~ffi)
conceptualized in this linguistic sense and do the additional work of grasp£
ing, understanding, or ranking propositions, beliefs, acceptances, claims, 6~
sentences in regard to their being rationally acceptable or tru~r1
Conceptualizing itself-even linguistic conceptualizing- need not invol~
propositions or beliefs (and so on) but epistemizing does. One cannot epi~£
temize the notion "chair" but one can epistemize the claim that the chairi~
leaning against the table. Some sort of conceptualizing is required for epi~~
temizing but not the reverse. No epistemizing is required for conceptuali~~
ing. Indeed, how one epistemizes the world depends more or less directly on'
how one conceptualizes the things in that world.
But there are other senses of conceptualizing that need not be linguistic&
]
Some concepts are pictorial. Others are diagrammatic, gestural, or presentll~

pel

~onal.

When we experience an abstract work of art or a tailor's sample or
a mechanic holds up a certain nut and bolt combination to show her
r~pprentice what he is to pick up at the auto parts shop, these all involve the
~~onceptual but not necessarily the linguistic. There is certainly some sort of
~~ental activity going on here, but not anything linguistic. Sometimes, of
t~ourse, we also use the linguistic in these circumstances, but then we are
ifising a different sort of conceptualizing. But the main point is that there are
~Yrobols and symbol systems that are not linguistic and within those symbol
!fystems, concepts are invented, reinvented, and pressed into a variety of
~ses, new and old, none of which need the linguistic and sometimes cannot
~~yen be accounted for linguistically. Such conceptualizing may not, therer(9re, be related to the epistemic, at least in anything like the ordering of
jpropositions or statements in terms of truth or rational belief as it is typical~y construed.
· Another kind of noetic feat is "emoting." This third classification is
!t):arder to describe because although I hold that emotings are cognitions, they
lte not, typically, easily capturable by language. Perhaps, then, emoting is
~~st another kind of nonlinguistic conceptualizing. We take on various atti;fudes and emotions toward things, truth-bearers, experiences, and other
[thoughts. These are not ways of organizing the world in terms of linguistic
i~oncepts but they are ways of organizing the world. They influence how we
jyalue things and ideas, order them and act on them. So we can talk generalabout emoting feats. Sometimes we can conceptualize them linguistically
r~nd then we can use them in forming truth-bearers and hence epistemize the
[~ropositional results. But these linguistic descriptions are mere reports about
[inner, subjective things to which no one but the emoter has immediate access
itexcept God). The emoting itself is not reducible to the reports about it, any
!fuore than a dance gesture is reducible to an essay about the dance.
The final kind of noetic feats are perceivers. Once again, this kind of
~ognition may be understood as a conceptualizing, but not a linguistic con~~eptualizing. What we are aware of perceptually may vary person to person
~~d even within the experience of a single person. These are, one and all,
iways of cognition and need not involve the linguistic.
i~hen

It

The Core Irrealist Argument
The typical noetic realist claims that epistemology and our cognitive
[~ctivities or noetic feats in general fall on one side of a dividing line and
~llletaphysics

falls on the other. To get us started, I urge us to take the realist

;~laim that epistemic and other noetic feats are distinct from metaphysics seri'~usly and not surreptitiously move between the two. Let us admit that, at first
r~lush, it certainly seems as if both our epistemizing and our conceptualizing

activities are distinct from the metaphysics of the world. Let us ~-.uuu,, t
that, prima facie, to say that p is true-a term most straight forwardly
stood as metaphysical and not epistemic-is not the same as saying
believed, justified, known, taken to be true, thought to be true,
so forth. These latter terms are best understood as epistemic. We
these terms are epistemizing terms, terms of epistemic evaluations or
ings. The alethic realist wants to keep these things completely separate
it comes to the account of truth. Epistemizing does not a truth make. I
with alethic realism. The noetic realist wants to do the same, putting
izing and conceptualizing on one side of a divide and the world on the
I disagree with the noetic realist. Given that noetic realism seems to
alethic realism but not vice versa, it seems that the noetic cum alethic
case rises and falls not with alethic realism but with noetic realism.
noetic realist pull both realisms off?
I think the answer is no. To see why, let us continue in the strategy~~
keeping epistemizing and cognizing radically separate from metaphysics
let us apply this separation to the argument from "Realism and Antirealism:r
A Dialogue." The argument is as follows:
(1) Contradictions are impossible.
(2) p (where p stands for nearly any metaphysical claim). 5
(3) ~p.
(4) Therefore, there is more than one world, one in which p is
another in which ~p is true.
(5) Therefore, truth is world relative.
What happens when we strip (1), (2), and (3) of epistemic evaluation~
and weightings? What follows logically, given the truth of (1), (2), and (3)~
is (4) and (5). We can argue, then, that a strict keeping of the dichotom~
between our epistemizing and reality puts pressure on the notion that th¢'
world is a singular way, independent of human noetic feats.
Now the realist might say that the reply is easy to see. We should shn+
ply take some one of (1 ), (2), and (3) to be false, in particular, if (2) and (3}
contradict each other, one of them must be false. Stated another way, the realp
ist might reply as follows. First, if W1 is actual, then p is true. Second, if
is actual, then ~p is true. Third, it is not both the case that p and ~p are true,
Therefore, it is either not the case that W1 is actual (and hence p is not true}
or it is not the case that W1 is actual (and hence ~pis not true). 6 In effect, thiS
argument suggests that (1 ), (2), and (3) cannot all be true and since contra~
dictions are impossible, either (2) or (3) must be false. It makes more sense

'"PI:

Wz

5. Here it is worth noting that Ganssle's presentation of my argument overlooks an impor•
tant caveat from "Realism and Irrealism: A Dialogue," namely, that some metaphysical claim~
will not work for the argument, in particular, claims about God.
6. Peter van Inwagen gave a less generalized form of this argument in an audience response
to an ancestor of this paper at the Realism and Antirealism Conference at Calvin College iri
2000.

to reject as false one of (2) or (3) than to reach the absurd conclusion that
there is more than one world.
Now I think this realist response in general, misses the point. First, the
realist's third premise ("it is not both the case that p is true and that ~p is
true") rests on an interpretation of the law of noncontradiction, namely, a
realist interpretation that there is only a singular world and a singular way
that singular world is. Without that realist interpretation, the third premise
does not go together with the first and second to give the conclusion.
Furthermore, the realist's argument is legitimate only if we epistemically
value the negation of (4) or (5) more highly than the affirmation of (1 ), (2),
and (3). But then the realist has slipped in some epistemic rankings, precisely what we agreed not to do.

Ganssle's Criticism
In a similarly motivated vein, I believe, Ganssle criticizes the argument.
He writes:
McLeod[-Harrison]'s claim is a classic false dichotomy. Epistemizing
can be useful without contributing to the way the world is. Certainly
any person's epistemizing contributes to the way that person thinks the
world is. But this is a different story-one that McLeod[-Harrison]
does not see. He admits that he cannot see it. About the law of noncontradiction, the irrealist claims, "In some sense, it is true because it
is the 'way things are,' and yet it is true because that is the way we take
it. It is hard to tell the difference. In fact, I see no difference in this
case" (35). Any use of epistemic categories reveals our implicit commitment to irrealism. 7

In response, first it is worth noting that to say there is no difference in
this case (of the law of noncontradiction) is not the same as saying, "I don't
see what it is the realist wants in the realist/nonrealist debate" or that "I'm
blind to the difference between the way the world is and the way one thinks
the world is." Having been a realist for most of my philosophical career, I
have a fairly good sense of what the realist wants to claim: the world is one
way and our conceptualizing or epistemizing it is no source of the way the
world is. I just no longer think the realist can get it. My claim is that at the
level of using the law of noncontradiction, we do and must interpret it. As
such, we epistemize it and thereby shape the rest of the metaphysics in which
we are engaged. Second, Ganssle charges my argument as presenting a "classic false dilemma." But where, exactly, does it do that? Earlier I quoted
Ganssle (summarizing my view): "the claim is that we hold to irrealism or
we refrain from all epistemizing." The real dilemma is this: either we are
7. Ganssle, review of Realism and Antirealism, 344.

irrealists or metaphysics is doomed. This is based on a more runlaruner
dilemma that either epistemizing contributes to the world or it does
irrealist can admit that epistemizing has many other uses beside mal<Inf!<
world without thereby denying that epistemizing makes the world.
dilemma is that either our epistemizing contributes to the world or it
not. It does not say that this is the only thing epistemizing does. In fact,
admit that epistemizing certainly does contribute to the way one
world is, as well as (sometimes) to the way the world is. I do not see
thing in what Ganssle says that undermines my argument. Finally,
notes, rightly, that I claim that the realist "interprets" the law of nor1co:nt
diction in a realist manner. I do say that. But I also say that the realist
temizes the law of noncontradiction. She or he epistemically ranks the
over against (2) and (3). This is where the real problem for realism lies.
in epistemizing the law of noncontradiction in what appears to be a
manner, she is already committed to irrealism because she is epistemizing
world by epistemizing logic. At this point, it seems impossible to talk
about this sort of epistemizing being simply about how the realist thinks
world is. Rather, she has made the world by epistemizing. She can do
other. If the realist tries to retreat to simply talking about how she thinks
world is, she cannot connect to the world itself. It turns out that even to
to be a realist assumes a conceptual/epistemic framework and hence ·
ism.
The realist assumes that the world is the (single) way it is, and that olijj
epistemizing has nothing to do with it. Thus they set aside any role for epis~
temic weighting or ranking in the metaphysics of the world. But Ganssle'~)
reply to my argument misses its main point. It is not that epistemizing does
not have other uses than contributing to the world. Rather it is that we can+:
not resolve metaphysical issues at all, including the realist/nonrealist one;
without epistemizing. It is not just that we epistemize how we think the world
is. It is that we actually epistemize the world itself simply by using the law
of noncontradiction in such a way that allows us to reach realist conclusions.
To do so already begs the question against irrealism and, by doing so, makes
any realist an irrealist! And here I restate my claim from the original essay}
When the irrealist wants to agree with the realist and actually set aside epis..
temic rankings, the realist slips in the epistemic rankings through the back
door. The realist cannot say that epistemizing must be set aside when doing
so favors realism and appeal to it when it does not. Either we can use epistemizing to make the world one way rather than another or we cannot. If we
can decide which way to order the premises and thereby make the world,
then our epistemizing, resting as it does on conceptualizing, contributes to
the way the world is and irrealism wins. If we cannot, then the irrealist argu..;
ment above goes through, pure logic wins, and there is more than one world.

Either way, irrealism wins. Minimally, the "common sense" stranglehold that
realism seems to have in the debate is broken.
Realism is not the obvious default position, and Ganssle is right to note
that I am saying that realists end up not being rational. If we try to avoid epistemic terms as realism demands, but then go on to defend realism, we are
forced to reintroduce the epistemic terms. The only other alternative is not to
avoid them, in which case we are back in irrealist territory before we begin.
In short, the realist's strategy forces her to admit that she epistemizes the
descriptions of reality and that such epistemizing is rooted, ultimately, in the
way we conceptualize. A world is the way it is, and we epistemically take it
to be so, because we have already conceptualized the world.

How Epistemizing Affects the World
Here I will say something a little more detailed about how epistemizing
contributes to the world and thereby move away from the epistemically ori!.)nted notion of truth that I appealed to in my earlier essay. Before we go any
further, we might note an apparent ambiguity in the irrealist argument thus
far developed. There are two senses of the term "decision." One is an epistemic sense of"decide," as in "I decide which statement is true." In this case,
I decide which way to believe. The other is a metaphysical sense, as in "I
decide which way the world is going to be," that is, the world is caused to be
the way it is by my believing it to be so. If one takes the latter, metaphysical
!Jleaning, then the argument as presented might find success and avoid the
\'way the world is" versus the "way one thinks the world is" confusion. Here
it is imperative that we not confuse or conflate alethic realism/nonrealism
with noetic realism/nonrealism. My believing that there are trees in the world
does not cause it to be true that there are trees in the world. That would be to
;Ufirm some sort of epistemic account of truth, some sort of alethic nonreal!sm. It is important to note, however, that one believes p is true only because
pf an ontologically prior commitment, namely, when the world is conceptu!llized a certain way. The decision, if one is made at all, is made on the level
pf conceptualization, language, symbol system, and so on, and the beliefs
(~ollow from the world thus conceptualized. To say that truth is world-relative
iis not, in short, to deny alethic realism. It is only to admit that different noet;~c-qua-conceptualizing feats generate different worlds. Truth is thus fixed in
~at world and alethic realism can still hold. But decision language here is
~tentially misleading and better left out of the conversation. We epistemize
~tatements (within a world) one way rather than another because we concep'fualize a world one way rather than another. We do not typically decide at all,
~ut are raised up into, trained and educated into, one way rather than anoth!.)r. At this ooint. it is clear that it is not believing that the world is one wav

that makes it that way. Rather, it is the prior conceptualizing. So how the
argument gets stated requires us to move beyond talking just of epistem ·
one way rather than another.
Returning now to the epistemic rather than the metaphysical
ing of "decision," we can see that it allows that the world is what it is
noetic contribution, meanwhile keeping our discovery of the world a
independent enterprise. We can take our best epistemic shot at the
our believing one way rather than another has no causal or creative
(from belief to world) at all. In defense of the irrealist, we can say that at
the realist is left with only being able to discuss worlds as we
them and not the world itself. Realism seems then to preclude ever
the world, and we are left with a very radical form of skepticism. The
known (reasoned about, argued over, and so on) is the world epistemized
not the world as it is in itself. Realism can never claim to know or, for
matter, rationally to surmise that the world itself is a realist world.
grounds could the realist produce except grounds filtered through her
temic weightings and rankings? One can never talk about the world
One can only talk about the world as it is rank-ordered. Is not that
many nonrealists are saying these days? There is little difference between
world we talk about and the world as it is. To suggest that the world is a
gular, fixed way is to assume something we cannot show without ePJstemi2[.;\;
ing. Either there is no functional difference between the world and the
epistemized by me (or us), or the world is simply beyond our means and
cannot talk about it.

The Supporting Argument
In "Realism and Irrealism: A Dialogue," I suggested a supporting arguf
ment for the core argument noted above. In it, I tried to avoid any decisio!J.
language to avoid the unhappy notion that we make the world by belie~
alone. I want to continue in that vein, but here make it even more explicit that
the notion of epistemizing should be taken very broadly. First, remembe~
epistemizing is a result of conceptualizing a world one way rather thatl.
another. Thus, we epistemize because of a prior creating of a world rathe~
than simply epistemizing a statement on its own, so to speak, and therefor€f
making it true. In short, we must keep noetic irrealism before us and not drop
into alethic irrealism. I have added alternative ways of putting the point to
keep this issue in front of us. That reminding caution in place, we can say:
(A) Either our conceptualizing-epistemizing premises (1 )-(3) con"'
tributes to the truth of (1 )-(3) or it does not. (Alternatively, we
might say: our conceptualizing the world makes (1) and (2) true ot
( 1) and (3) true but not both.)

(B) If our conceptualizing-epistemizing (1 )-(3) contributes to the truth
of (1 )-(3), then irrealism obtains. (Alternatively: if our conceptualizing the world makes either (1) and (2) true or (1) and (3) true but
not both, then irrealism obtains.)
(C) If our conceptualizing-epistemizing ( 1)-(3) does not contribute to
the truth of (1 )-(3), then the irrealist argument is successful, and
irrealism obtains. (Alternatively: if our conceptualizing the world
does not make either (1) and (2) true or (1) and (3) true but not both,
then the irrealist argument is successful and irrealism obtains.)
(D) Therefore, irrealism obtains.
Some explanation is due.
Taken straightforwardly, premise (B) simply gives us irrealism. Suppose
we epistemize (1)-(3), according to one conceptual framework rather than
another. That is, suppose we conceptualize the world such that either (2) or
(3) turns out to be true. The antecedent of (B) then is either true or false. If
it is true, then the truth of(l)-(3) depends somehow on our conceptualizingepistemizing them. This rests on our conceptualizing the world one way
rather than another, in which case there is surely more than one way the
world is and no reason apart from our conceptualizing the world(s) to pick
one over the other. For there is more than one way to conceptualize-epistemize (1)-(3). Truth, thus, is world relative. Irrealism obtains. On the other
hand, if the antecedent of (B) is false, then the truth of (1 )-(3) has nothing to
do with conceptualizing-epistemizing and thus conceptualizing-epistemizing
is irrelevant to the irrealist argument presented above. This irrelevance drives
a large wedge between epistemology and metaphysics, precisely what the
realist typically claims. Thus (C) comes into play.
The antecedent of (C) says that the truth of ( 1)-(3) is in no way shaped
by our conceptualizing-epistemic stance toward (1 )-(3). So, if we do not in
any way conceptualize-epistemize the premises in the irrealist argument,
then we cannot appeal to reasons to reject any of the premises. That leaves
three possibilities concerning the truth or falsity of (1 )-(3 ). However, before
exploring those possibilities, it is important to note that the discussion is not
focused on defending the truth of (1)-(3) (that would be to rank them epistemically) but rather on understanding what true epistemic neutrality looks
like in regard to this argument. So the issue is not whether we actually have
evidence for or against the truth of any ofthe premises. Ifwe had such evidence, it would be because we had already conceptualized the world one way
rather than another. We must first have a conceptualized world to have reasons. The real question is, since we are not allowed to appeal to such evidence, how are we to treat (1 )-(3)? As it turns out, it looks like the position
that claims all the premises are true is at least as viable as any other position-in fact superior to some-and therefore the argument goes through.

Let us consider the possible combination of truth values for the pre
es. First, let us suppose all the premises are false. No solace for realis
found here. Because all three are false, ( 1) is false. But then contradic
would be possible and that is a fate worse than irrealism, for then an
goes. We are left with a true and complete antirealism that is no better
a radical relativism. So if we get irrealism, if (l )-(3) are true, we get a
of antirealism if (l) is false. Taking this route will not help the realist.
second possibility is that some of (l)-(3) are true and others false. But w
ones? We can tell right away that it will not be (l) that is false, without
dering the worlds not only multiple but completely relative. That leaves
with (2) and (3). While it is possible that one is true and the other not, wi
out introducing some reason to pick one over another (which, by assumpti
we cannot do, for that is to epistemize them, that is, to have already contcetr¥1:
tualized the world) we look to be on shaky ground. Why should we take
situation one way rather than another? According to the realist ..u ...,uv<vH
between epistemology and ontology, believing, knowing, taking, acc:eo1ttn!!'2i
and so forth, have nothing to do with the way reality is. In remaining
temically neutral, we cannot, by supposition, epistemically rank-order
premises one way or another. That leaves the third possibility, that (l)-(3)
all true. But then (4) and (5) follow, and irrealism obtains. One could
that evidence can be marshaled against (1), (2), or (3). But to marshal
evidence is to epistemize the premises, for we will have already ,..,...,.,,..o....
ized the world one way rather than another. Again, we cannot do that, by
position. Hence, if we are consistent to not introduce epistemic r"r"<-•-.rnPr~·
ing, the irrealist argument is successful, and irrealism obtains.
Now a particularly recalcitrant realist may still say that the world is th~
way it is completely independent of the way we relate to it epistemically. In)
particular, he may admit how the first and third possible combinations of'
truth values go, but not admit the second. Why not just retreat to the positioti
that we do not know which of (2) and (3) is false, but that one must be true
while the other is false? There is no need to introduce epistemic rankings but
just admit that one or the other is not true. The irrealist response to this is
simple and direct. The realist must admit that realism is stuck, on the one
hand, between the rock of admitting that conceptualizing-epistemizing con4
tributes to the metaphysical nature of the world (and hence what is true or
not), and, on the other hand, the hard place of skepticism. But actually the
irrealist can press another issue here, pushing the realist into an even worse
position. As it turns out, there is no non circular way of being a realist, once.
the realist retreats to the position of admitting that realism could be wrong
about the way the world is.
Premise (1) is actually metaphysically neutral between there being a singular world and multiple worlds. That is, although (1) is taken to be true,
there is no built-in commitment to a singular-world realist interpretation of
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the law of noncontradiction over against an irrealist, multiple-world interpretation. An irrealist not only can desire to hold (1) but is certainly free to do
so. One difference between the realist and the irrealist on this score is that the
irrealist can truly remain open to where the argument might go. The irrealist
who remains epistemically neutral about (1) through (3) actually does not
beg any epistemic questions about them. By remaining neutral in this way,
the irrealist gets the conclusions, (4) and (5). About this, the irrealist is quite
sanguine.
How can the realist avoid these irrealist conclusions? What reason can
the realist proffer to defend the single-world interpretation of (1 )? None.
Except, perhaps, to assert that there is only one world, along with the singular-world realist interpretation of the law of noncontradiction. But that is the
realist thesis itself and that begs the question against the irrealist position.
Again, realism is not the default position on these matters. Irrealism is, I
believe, on better ground.
One final word of caution. It is a point made in "Realism and Irrealism:
A Dialogue" but one overlooked in Ganssle's review. While it looks as if one
can substitute whatever one wishes for p and ~p, in the end, there are some
very important exceptions to this. I cannot take the space to argue the point
here, but can offer a promissory note stating that I believe it can be argued
that God's existence is a fixed feature of all the worlds. Similarly, but for different reasons, humans too, since their creation by God, are fixed features
across worlds. Finally, I think the case can be made for moral and aesthetic
realities to be fixed as well. Nevertheless, there are plenty of other controversial and contradictory metaphysical positions that will provide grist for my
irrealist mill. All the irrealist needs is some argument with contradictory
metaphysical statements substituted for p and ~p. She need not offer those as
epistemically ranked propositions. She need only offer the bare logic of the
situation. She needs no other reason. The strict separation of epistemic concerns from metaphysical ones opens the door to irrealism, just the opposite
result from what a typical realist might expect.

